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RECENT DECISIONS
causation or of negligence even though it does not negative the exis-
tence of remote possibilities."
R. E. B.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-DECLARATION oF DIVIDENDS-SOURCE
-GoOD-WILL-UNREALIZED APPREcIATIoN.-Plaintiff, as Trustee in
Bankruptcy of the Bush Terminal Company, brings this action against
former directors of the corporation to recover on its behalf the amount
of cash dividends declared and distributed during the years 1928-1932
aggregating $3,639,058.06. The defendant directors are sought to be
held personally liable under Section 581 of the Stock Corporation
Law, as it existed when the dividends here involved were declared
and paid. Plaintiff claims: that, although the company's books
showed a surplus at the times of the declarations and payments, there
was in fact no surplus; and that the capital was actually impaired by
the full amount of each of the dividends declared in violation of
Section 58. In 1902 defendant Irving T. Bush controlled the Bush
Company, Ltd. which was engaged in a going terminal enterprise on
the Brooklyn waterfront. This company owned warehouses, piers
and railroad facilities. During this year the Bush Terminal Com-
pany was formed, and Mr. Bush entered into a contract with the
newly formed company; pursuant to which it issued to Mr. Bush
$2,000,000 in bonds and $3,000,000 in par value common stock and
received, in addition to certain services of Mr. Bush, a large tract of
industrially improved land contiguous to that owned by the Bush Coin-
111ngersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. (2d) 828
(1938).
1 N. Y. STocK CoRp. LAw § 58, as it existed during the period involved here
provided as follows: "DIDENDs. No stock corporation shall declare or pay
any dividend which shall impair its capital or capital stock nor while its capital
or capital stock is impaired, ... unless the value of the assets remaining after
the payment of such dividend... shall be at least equal to the aggregate amount
of its debts and liabilities including capital or capital stock as the case may be.
In case any such dividend shall be paid... the directors in whose administration
the same shall have been declared or made, except those who may have caused
their dissent therefrom to be entered upon the minutes of the meetings of direc-
tors at the time or who were not present when such action was taken shall be
liable jointly and severally to such corporation and to the creditors thereof to
the full amount of any loss sustained by such corporation or by its creditors
respectively by reason of such dividend. .. ." Under this statute, good faith
on the part of directors in declaring such dividends was no defense to an action
for their recovery. Quintal v. Greenstein, 142 Misc. 854, 256 N. Y. Supp. 462,
aff'd, 236 App. Div. 719, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (1st Dept. 1932). By N. Y.
Lavs 1939, c. 364, §§ 1, 2, § 58 was amended so as to provide a defense to those
directors "who affirmatively show that they had reasonable grounds to believe,
and did believe, that such dividend . . . would not impair the capital of such
corporation." This amendment was expressly made inapplicable to dividends
declared and paid prior to its enactment, hence it does not affect the instant case.
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pany, Ltd. and a lease by the latter of certain other lands. The
$3,000,000 of common stock was not entered on the books of the
newly formed corporation until 1905 when for the first time there
appeared on the books of account a corresponding asset account
labeled "Good-Will". The $3,000,000 "good-will" item continued to
appear on the books from 1905 until this action was brought. It was
not challenged until this action. The company's land was carried on
its books at cost until 1915. In that year, it was written up to 80%o
of its assessed valuation, and in 1918 it was further written up to the
exact amount at which it was assessed. The result of these write-ups
constituted a net appreciation in the fixed assets account of $7,211,-
791.72, so that during the period in question the land was carried on
the books at $8,737,949.02, whereas its actual cost was $1,526,157.30.
In computing the amount of surplus during the years 1928-1932
plaintiff contended: that (1) it was improper to include as an asset
the good-will item of $3,000,000; (2) the "write-up" of land values in
the amount of $7,211,791.72 over cost carried on the books reflected
merely unrealized appreciation in the value of such land. Held, in
favor of defendants. Randall, as Trustee, etc. v. Bailey, et al., 23
N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (1940).
Good-will 2 is presumptively an asset which must be accounted
for and may be sold like any other asset upon liquidation of a busi-
ness.3 The chief elements of value upon any sale of good-will are:
(a) continuity of place; (b) continuity of name, and in an enterprise
of a complex nature the further element of continuity of organization
is reflected in its value. 4 As property, it is peculiarly within the
province of directors to fix its value, and in the absence of fraud the
judgment of directors as to its value is conclusive. 5 In the instant
case, the $3,000,000 good-will item remained on the books for about
thirty-five years including the period in question; during which time
the enterprise expanded and flourished, and its profits continuously
increased. In spite of a long corporate history of prosperity this item
remained constant. No fraud; bad faith, or abuse of discretion was
shown on the part of the directors in evaluating the good-will in
1905.6 The defendants, therefore, were justified in retaining this
2 Washburn v. National Wallpaper Co., 81 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897);
People ex rel. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 53 N. E. 685 (1899) ; Von
Bremen v. MacMonnies, 200 N. Y. 41, 93 N. E. 186 (1910); In re Stevens, 46
Misc. 623, 95 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1905) ; 28 C. J. (1922) § 1.
3Matter of Brown, 242 N. Y. 1,'150 N. E. 581 (1926).
4 People ex rel. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, 53 N. E. 685 (1899);
Matter of Brown, 242 N. Y. 1, 150 N. E. 581 (1926).
5 N. Y. STocK CoRP. LAw § 69 (". . . Any Corporation may purchase
any property . . . necessary for the use and lawful purposes of such corpora-
tion, and may issue stock to the amount of the value thereof in payment there-
for ... and in the absence of fraud in the transaction the judgment of the
directors as to the value of the property purchased shall be conclusive. .. ") ;
Estate Planning Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F. (2d) 15(C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
, G Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 30 Sup. Ct. 615 (1910) ; Des
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item on the books from 1928 to 1932, for they acted within the bounds
of reason and discretion.7
With respect to unrealized appreciation, the question whether
dividends can be declared therefrom depends largely upon the history
and the construction of the statute.8 The earliest provisions relating
to duties and liabilities of directors in regard to dividends made it
unlawful to declare dividends "excepting from the surplus profits
arising from the business" or to "divide, withdraw or in any way pay
to the stockholders or any of them, any part of the capital stock".9
These statutes were repealed in 1890, and then for the first time there
appeared a sentence defining impairment of capital stock. 10 In
189211 and 1901 12 the amendments made in 1890 13 were again
repealed, and there was a return to the old language of the Revised
Statutes. However, in 192314 these statutes were again amended
and reenacted as Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law as it existed
when the dividends here involved were declared and paid. The his-
tory of the statute in question thus manifests a conscious intent on the
part of the legislature to get away from the "surplus profits" test as
the sole source of dividends and substitute the "value of the assets"
test.15 The later decisions likewise support the view that "value"
is the test of impairment.'" Cost, or book value, is not a true
Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (1915); Los
Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289
U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637 (1933); Washburn v. National Wallpaper Co., 81
Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897) ; Thomas v. Sutherland, 52 F. (2d) 592 -(C. C. A.
3d, 1931); White, Corbin and Co. v. Jones, 79 App. Div. 373, 79 N. Y. Supp.
583 (4th Dept. 1903).
7 White, Corbin and Co. v. Jones, 79 App. Div. 373, 79 N. Y. Supp. 583
(4th Dept. 1903).
8 See note 2, supra.
0 N. Y. Laws 1925, c. 325, § 2; 4 N. Y. Rav. STAT. § 2 (1830).
10 N. Y. Laws 1890, c. 564, § 23 ("... The capital stock of a stock corpo-
ration shall be deemed impaired when the value of its property and assets after
deducting the amount of its debts and liabilities, shall be less than the amount
of its paid up capital stock."). The original phrase, "surplus profits arisingfrom the business" was also changed to "surplus profits of its business."
11 N. Y. Laws 1892, c. 688, § 23. The heading of this section was also
changed to read: "Liability of directors for making unauthorized dividends" in
lieu of "Liability of directors for dividends not made from surplus profits."
'12 N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 354, § 23.
13 See notes 10, 11, supra.
14 See note 2, supra. The heading of this section was changed to "Divi-
dends" thereby omitting any reference to surplus or surplus profits.
15 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 664 provided in part that a director ".. . who con-
curs in any vote, 1.-To make a dividend, except from surphts profits arising
from the business . .. is guilty of a misdemeanor." By N. Y. Laws 1924,
c. 221, this section was amended to read in its present form: ". . . 1.-To make
a dividend, except from surphs, .. ." This change was probably enacted in
order to conform to § 58 of the N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAw.
16 Bourne v. Bourne, 240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925) ; Small v. Sulli-
van, 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927) (referring to N. Y. STOCK CoRP.
LAw § 58, the court said: "The object of the provision was to prevent a with-
drawal of the property which would reduce the value of the assets below the
sum limited for its capital in its charter. When the property of the corporation
19411]
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test.17 The surplus account represents the net assets of a corporation
in excess of all liabilities including its capital stock. This surplus may
be paid-in surplus, earned surplus, or may consist of increases result-
ing from a revaluation of fixed assets.' 8 It is well settled that divi-
dends may be declared from accumulated surplus 19 and from paid-in
surplus.2 0 With respect to dividends declared from appreciation in
the value of assets, such dividends have been held to be taxable as
dividends paid. 21 Therefore, if value of the assets, and not cost, is
the proper test, and surplus may take the form of unrealized apprecia-
exceeds that limit, the excess is surplus which may be divided among the
stockholders.") ; Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder, 152 Misc. 83, 271 N. Y. Supp. 795
(1934); Gallagher v. Davison, N. Y. L. J., June 13, 1935, p. 3045, col. 7;
Gallagher v. New York Dock Co., 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 789 (1940).
• 17 Book values of assets or cost aloie do not always reflect actual value, but
are some evidence of true value. Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder, 152 Misc. 83,
271 N. Y. Supp. 795 (1934). Value constitutes the important factor in eminent
domain, taxation and public utility rate regulation. Some types of evidence of
value which have been held admissible are: (a) Reproduction cost less deprecia-
tion--Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, (1898) (public utility rate
regulation) ; Matter of the City of New York (Blackwell's Island Bridge), 198
N. Y. 84, 91 N. E. 278 (1910) (eminent domain); People ex rel. New York
Dock Co. v. -Cantor, 208 App. Div. 52, 203 N. Y. Supp. 424 (2d Dept. 1924)
(taxation); (b) Capitalization of earnings-Matter of the City of New York
(Blackwell's Island Bridge), 198 N. Y. 84, 91 N. E. 278 (1910) (eminent
domain); People ex rel. Third Avenue R. R. v. State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners, 157 App. Div. 731, 142 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1st Dept. 1913), aff'd, 212
N. Y. 472, 106 N. E. 325 (1914) (taxation); People ex rel. Lehigh Valley R. R.
v. Harris, 168 Misc. 685, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 794 (1938),.aff'd, 257 App. Div. 912,
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 1011 (4th Dept. 1939), af'd, 281 N. Y. 786, 24 N. E. (2d)
476 (1939) (taxation) ; (c) Market price of stocks and bonds-State Railroad
Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875) (involving taxation of the value of a railroad
franchise); Bailey v. Megan, 102 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); (d)
Assessed vlue-Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N. Y. 83, 4 N. E. (2d) 944 (1936)
(assessed value of property admissible to determine value of real property in
proceeding for deficiency judgment under N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §.1083a);
Matter of the Board of Water Supply, 277 N. Y. 452, 14 N. E. (2d) 789
(1938) (eminent domain); (e) Prior recent sales of similar property in the
vicinity-Manhattan Co. v. Premier Building Corp., 247 App. Div. 297, 285
N. Y. Supp. 806 (2d Dept. 1936) (deficiency judgment under N. Y. Civ. PRAc.
AcT § 1083a).
is Mr. Justice Brandeis in Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204, 46 Sup. Ct.
85 (1925).
19 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919) ; Kent
v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1897); Williams v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883) ; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y.
257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906).
20 Eiluitable Life Assurance Co. v. Union Pacific R. R, 212 N. Y. 360,
106 N. E. 92 (1914).
21 People ex rel. Wedgewood Realty Co. v. Lynch, 262 N. Y. 202, 186
N. E. 673 (1933). In this case the taxpayer later moved to amend the
remittitur which in effect would omit from surplus any unrealized appreciation
in the cost of the value of real estate. In a per curiain opinion the motion was
denied, 262 N. Y. 644, 188 N. E. 102 (1933). It is submitted that the denial of
the motion was at least a tacit approval of the propriety of declaring dividends
from unrealized appreciation.
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tion, it follows that unrealized appreciation may constitute a proper
source from which dividends may be declared.
22
P.C.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE OF POLICE OFFICER-MUNICIPAL IMMU-
NITY LIMITED BY STATUTE-CONSTRUCTION.-Plaintiff's intestate,
while lawfully on a public street in New York City, was killed as a
result of injuries received when a commandeered automobile, negli-
gently operated by a municipal police officer in the pursuit of suspi-
cious characters who were fleeing from the officer, ran into the dece-
dent and his pushcart. This action was brought against the City of
New York and other defendants to recover damages for the death.
Trial Term dismissed the plaintiff's complaint against the City of
New York. On appeal, held, the judgment at Trial Term unani-
mously affirmed. Berger v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 402,
22 N. Y. S. (2d) 1006 (2d Dept. 1940).
No recovery can be had on common law principles against a
municipal corporation for the torts of policemen or other municipal
appointees whose duties are undertaken in the fulfillment by the
municipal corporation of its governmental as distinguished from its
corporate functions.1 The plaintiff-appellant contended that he has a
remedy under Section 50-a of the General Municipal Law,2 which is
22 Plaintiff further contended that it was improper not to "write down" to
actual value on the company's books the cost of investments in and advances to
subsidiaries and thereby fail to take unrealized depreciation into account. Thus,
plaintiff took the inconsistent position by arguing that investments and advances
must be taken at their actual value, whereas fixed assets are to be considered
only at cost. In short, the directors should have taken unrealized depreciation
into account, while unrealized appreciation should have been disregarded. The
patent inconsistency of this position was resolved by the court by stating: "that
the same reasons which show that unrealized appreciation must be considered
are equally cogent in showing that unrealized depreciation must be considered.
In other words, the test being whether or not the value of the assets exceeds
the debts and the liability to stockholders, all assets must be taken at their
actual value." However, although plaintiff's position was correct as to these
investments and advances and also with respect to certain demolished properties
which should have been written off and not considered in computing the amount
of surplus, even if all these deductions claimed by the plaintiff were allowed in
full, the actual value of the land and improvements at all times during the period
in question exceeded the book value thereof by an amount sufficient to show a
surplus greater than the amount of the dividends.
I Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875);
Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 150 N. Y. 450, 44 N. E. 1038(1896); Lefrois v. County of Monroe, 162 N. Y. 563, 57 N. E. 185 (1900);
Wilcox v. City of Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119 (1907) ; Lacock v.
City of Schenectady, 224 App. Div. 512, 231 N. Y. Supp. 379 (3d Dept. 1928) ;
Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (1939),
aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (3d Dept. 1940).
2 Formerly N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 282-g.
19411]
